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1Foreword
Foreword
The Government has begun a major programme of pension reform. These reforms
are based on an extensive, sound evidence base, contained, for example, in:
• The First Report of the Pensions Commission;
• The Second Report of the Pensions Commission;
• Security in Retirement: towards a new pensions system and its accompanying
Regulatory Impact Assessment;
• The Pensions Bill and the accompanying documents published today.
Because of the scale and importance of these reforms, the Government is keen to
continue to develop this evidence base. To contribute to this aim, the Government
has undertaken, and continues to undertake, a range of innovative, exploratory
analysis. This paper contains an exploration of method and early results from work
which examines the macro-economic and social welfare impacts of elements of
reform.
The analysis presented here is meant not as the conclusion of the work, but as an
exposition of preliminary thinking. The Government would welcome the views of
academics and other experts on the techniques used and preliminary findings
presented. Comments should be directed to Clement van de Coevering
(Clement.Van-de-Coevering@dwp.gsi.gov.uk).

3Summary
Summary
This paper examines the impact of two effects of the pension reform package that
was put forward in the May White Paper Security in retirement: towards a new
pensions system: the likely increase in the number of older people working due to a
higher State Pension age and the likely rise in saving due to more people putting
away money for retirement.
State Pension age is currently 65 for men and 60 for women. There has been a long-
planned increase in women’s pension age to 65, due to take place between 2010
and 2020, which is not examined in this paper. However, the Government has
announced that State Pension age for men and women will then rise from 65 to 66
by 2026, to 67 by 2036 and to 68 by 2046. Not everyone retires at State Pension age,
but it is likely that this increase will lead to more people working.  This will result in an
increase in the size of the economy. There is considerable uncertainty about people’s
exact response to the reforms, so we present results as ranges. The paper explores
different techniques to estimate the size of this impact. It finds that by 2050 the
economy could be 1.4 – 1.7 per cent larger than it would be if reform had not taken
place.
The introduction of personal accounts is thought likely to increase pension saving,
although, again, individual responses are difficult to predict with certainty. Analysis
suggests that the increase in saving for retirement could lead to a long-term growth
in UK incomes of around 0.2 per cent. This would occur as UK residents increased
their ownership of domestic and foreign companies and other assets that they invest
in through their pension funds. The ownership of these assets would generate
returns which would ultimately allow people in the UK to spend more.
The overall effect of changes to State Pension age and the introduction of personal
accounts on UK incomes is likely to be in the range of 0.9 – 3.1 per cent. Although
these numbers are relatively small proportions of the total economy, they represent
significant sums. In terms of today’s economy, they would be worth around £11 –
38 billion.
4In addition to the economic impact of reform, the paper also explores its impact on
people’s wellbeing through improved consumption smoothing.
The Government provides a safety net to avoid pensioner poverty, and most people
will achieve a basic level of pension through the State Pension system. However, it is
in most people’s interest to save on top of this for their retirement to avoid a big fall
in their income when they stop working. This is because many people prefer to
maintain a reasonably smooth pattern of consumption throughout life, than to have
a relatively high level of consumption while they are working and then a much lower
level once they retire.
Whilst many people would recognise the desirability of saving for retirement,
analysis, for example presented by the Pensions Commission, suggests many are not
saving enough to smooth their consumption effectively. According to the latest
estimates at least seven million people are currently not saving enough to avoid a
significant fall in their standard of living at retirement. The introduction of personal
accounts is expected to lead to a large increase in the number of people saving for
their retirement, leading them to be able to maintain a more consistent standard of
living over their lives. This will improve the wellbeing of these individuals and, as
social welfare is the total of the wellbeing of individuals, it will increase welfare
across society.
This paper uses innovative economic analysis to examine the scale of this increase in
people’s wellbeing. It finds that if people save for retirement through personal
accounts, then generally their wellbeing will be enhanced. As more people delay
spending their income from when they are in work to when they are in retirement,
we will feel better off as a society because of the increase in individual wellbeing.
Summary
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1 Introduction
1.1 Background
The Government White Paper Security in retirement: towards a new pensions
system1, published in May 2006, contained a pension reform package that is
designed to provide a long-lasting framework. It also announced the intention to
produce this technical paper, to assess in more detail the economic and social
welfare impacts of two particular aspects of the reforms, the introduction of
personal accounts and measures to extend working life. This paper explores possible
methodological approaches to how the economic and social welfare effects could
be measured and using these methodologies provides quantitative estimates. This
paper is not a definitive statement on the magnitude of outcomes from pension
reform, about which there is substantial uncertainty, but suggests the direction and
possible scale of the effects.
A number of challenges to the current pension system were identified in the White
Paper. It concluded that pension reform is needed to address demographic and
social change, the large number of people who are undersaving for retirement and
the complexity of and the inequalities inherent in the State Pension system. To cope
with these challenges, as well as improve outcomes for individuals and society as a
whole, the White Paper announced the following policy measures:
• The uprating of the basic State Pension with earnings rather than prices and the
reform of the State Second Pension into a flat rate pension;
• The improvement of coverage by the basic State Pension by reducing the number
of years of contributions necessary to qualify and the introduction of new credits
for carers;
• The gradual increase in the State Pension age and the consideration of other
measures to extend working life, such as greater flexibility around State Pension
deferral;
1 Department for Work and Pensions (DWP), 2006. Hereafter referred to as the
White Paper.
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• The introduction of personal accounts to enable and encourage individuals who
are not currently saving to start to do so; and
• The streamlining of the regulatory environment, including the abolition of
contracting out for defined contribution pension schemes.
The impacts of the increase in the State Pension age and the introduction of personal
accounts will be analysed in detail in the remainder of this paper.
1.2 Increasing State Pension age and extending working
life
Life expectancy has improved considerably since State retirement pensions were first
introduced, and is projected to continue to do so into the future. Despite this trend,
the average age of exit from the labour market fell from the 1950s to the mid-1990s.
Although this trend has shown signs of reversal in recent years, the average age of
retirement remains below historical levels. For example, in 1950 men retired at 67 on
average and women at 64. By contrast, comparable figures for the present day show
an average retirement age of 64 and 62 respectively (see Figure 1.1), while life
expectancy at 65 in 2006 was almost nine years longer than in 1950.
Figure 1.1 Trends in mean age of retirement in the UK
7Continuing increases in life expectancy mean that were State Pension age to remain
fixed at its present level, the current State Pension system would be paying for
progressively longer retirements. Increasing State Pension age in response to
increasing longevity, as announced in the White Paper, is intended to ensure that
the state retirement pension system can provide a sound foundation for working
and saving decisions on a sustainable basis.
The increase in State Pension age will, however, need to be accompanied by cultural
and behavioural changes around retirement to produce an increase in the average
retirement age. Working longer is the logical response to an ageing population. On
an individual basis working longer enables individuals to build up greater savings for
retirement and can stabilise the length of time spent in retirement. Additionally, the
more people who are in work and contributing to the growth of the economy, the
more funds there will be available to support those people who are in retirement.
State Pension age may influence the retirement decision through two channels. The
first is that the State Pension age is set at a specific age defined by the Government
and, therefore, creates a culture of expectation of retiring at that age. The second is
that upon reaching State Pension age, individuals have access to an additional
source of income, thus giving people the financial means to stop working.2
While State Pension age is important in influencing people’s retirement decision it is
only one factor determining the timing of retirement. The most common retirement
ages are 60 for women and 65 for men – the current State Pension ages – (see Figure
1.2) suggesting the importance of State Pension age in signalling or as a cultural
reference point in determining retirement behaviour. But labour market activity
rates show a decline from age 55 onwards demonstrating that other factors are also
important. Almost half of all men exit the labour market before reaching State
Pension age (see Figure 1.3).
The Government has already put in place or planned a number of measures
intended to change the culture and behaviour surrounding retirement. These
include the New Deal 50 plus employment programme to help older workers, the
Age Positive campaign, the Be Ready promotional campaign to raise awareness
ahead of the introduction of age discrimination legislation in October 2006, more
generous increments in the State Pension when deferring it and equalisation of
State Pension age for men and women between 2010 and 2020.
Introduction
2 Humphrey et al., 2003.
8Figure 1.2 Average annual decline in activity rates of single-year
cohorts
Figure 1.3 Economic activity, by age (men)
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The White Paper also proposes a number of measures to extend working life
including:
• Consideration of how State Pension deferral might in the future offer greater
flexibility, both in terms of the amount drawn and deferred, and allowing people
more flexibility to move in and out of work after State Pension age;
• Providing improved communications and information in support of longer
working; and
• Working in partnership with employers to encourage them to retain older workers,
and to offer them greater flexibility around retirement.
The recent Government publication, A new deal for welfare: Empowering people to
work3, also proposes a series of measures to boost support for older people
returning to work and to improve the information available about options for work
and retirement. These include aligning employment support for older long-term
unemployed people with that for younger age groups, improving back-to-work
support for Jobseeker’s Allowance claimants and their dependent partners who are
over 50 and piloting of face-to-face guidance sessions with people approaching 50
or over.
The measures outlined above should provide greater support for those wishing to
continue in work for longer and those older workers seeking to return to work.
1.3 Personal accounts
In the White Paper, the Government proposed the introduction of a system of
personal accounts in 2012. This policy aims to enable individuals not already in a
pension scheme to make their own low cost retirement provision. Eligible employees
will be automatically enrolled into the new scheme or an existing employer scheme,
but have the right to opt out if they wish to. Participants will make contributions
along with their employers and the State4. These contributions will be on a defined
contribution basis, in which the fund at retirement will depend on the level of
contributions and fund growth during the accumulation phase. Individuals will have
appropriate levels of choice over how to invest their funds. The accounts will be
portable between employers and between periods of employment and self-
employment.
3 DWP, 2005.
4 Employers will have the choice whether to automatically enrol employees into
personal accounts or into a different employer-sponsored scheme that qualifies
for exemption.
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The new scheme will:
• Significantly increase the number of people currently saving for retirement.
Modelling suggests that around ten million employees could be newly
automatically enrolled into a personal account. In addition to this, it is estimated
that a further 0.7 million employees who work for an employer who currently
offers an adequate employer pension scheme, but are not members, could be
automatically enrolled into their employer scheme. In total, it is estimated that
10.8 million employees could be automatically enrolled into a pension following
the reform. Once assumptions are made about the number of employees who
are likely to opt out of personal accounts and allowed for opt in membership by
the self employed, the central estimate of the number of people in personal
accounts is around eight million. In addition around an additional 0.3 million
employees would be automatically enrolled and would not opt out of their
employer scheme once automatic enrolment is introduced.
• Have low charges so that individuals keep more of their savings. The management
charges on personal accounts would be lower than on most currently available
personal pensions: the current charge cap for annual management charges for
stakeholder pensions is 1.5 per cent in the first ten years falling to one per cent
per year after that. Occupational pension schemes and some group personal
pension schemes are able to achieve administrative charges equivalent to around
0.3 to 0.5 per cent or less. Therefore, people automatically enrolled into these
schemes will also benefit from low charges.
The key features of the scheme will be:
• An organisational structure that ensures low charges and good-quality service
for individuals;
• Automatic enrolment for all eligible employees, but with the freedom to opt
out;
• A minimum overall level of contribution from employers, employees and the
Government, to promote a minimum level of pension saving, with people
encouraged to contribute more. The minimum overall contribution is eight per
cent of earnings between around £5,000 and £33,000, the split of contributions
is as follows:
– employers contributing three per cent;
– employees contributing four per cent; and
– the State contributing one per cent as normal tax relief, as under the current
rules;5
5 One per cent represents basic rate tax relief on individuals’ contributions – in
addition, individuals may be entitled to higher-rate tax relief and neither employers
nor employees pay tax or National Insurance contributions on employer
contributions.
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• A national minimum employer contribution, increasing incentives to save. For all
employees, whether they access pension saving through personal accounts or
existing pension provision, if they remain in the scheme they will receive a
minimum employer contribution of three per cent of earnings between around
£5,000 and £33,000;
• Opt-in access available to those not automatically enrolled, including the self-
employed; and
• Portable and flexible accounts, to fit in with modern life and the greater likelihood
of people moving between jobs.
1.4 Measuring impacts of policies
This report will look at two different ways of measuring the impact of the increase in
State Pension age and the introduction of personal accounts. We first consider
economic effects, in the context of which two complementary approaches are used.
The first is a partial approach that can quickly provide estimates of the economic
effects based on assumptions around changes in employment rates. The second
method is more comprehensive and uses NiGEM, a macroeconomic model of the UK
economy developed by the National Institute of Economic and Social Research
(NIESR), to analyse these effects. Finally we develop an innovative method to
estimate the social welfare impact of the introduction of personal accounts.
1.5 Economic impacts
In measuring the economic impacts we are looking at how the reform impacts on
the size of the economy or national income, as either measured by the gross
domestic product (GDP), which is a measure of the total value of final goods and
services produced within a country’s borders in a year, or gross national product
(GNP) which is the value of all goods and services produced in a country in one year,
plus income earned by its residents abroad, minus income payable to non-residents.
If total economic resources are increased, this means that more income is potentially
available to individuals for consumption. Chapter 2 looks at a simple partial
equilibrium model to estimate the impact of increasing State Pension age, while
Chapter 3 uses a dynamic general equilibrium model of the economy to measure the
impacts of both State Pension age changes and increases in saving on the size of the
economy.
1.6 Welfare impacts
The aim of many reforms of public policy is to make society as a whole feel better off
or, in other words, to increase social welfare. To gain insight into the aggregate
concept of social welfare, analysing individual welfare, or utility (an economists’
term for describing an individual’s or a society’s wellbeing), is a useful approach.
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Research6 suggests that, while utility is not identical to the more comprehensible
term happiness, the two concepts are closely related. Utility is by no means
straightforward to measure. It is influenced by a vast number of factors, some of
them intangible. Furthermore, each individual attaches different values to certain
things. For example, one person may accumulate as many goods as possible to
maximise their wellbeing, while another’s happiness may derive from the knowledge
that she lives in an environment where her rights are protected by sound institutions
and she receives good healthcare when necessary.
For analytical purposes, consumption of goods and services including leisure is
usually the main component of utility. This is an abstraction from reality but it is
useful in a model context. Furthermore, research has found that income and
happiness are correlated, making income an imperfect yet useful indicator for
happiness and overall levels of welfare.
Our model estimates social welfare by aggregating the welfare of all individuals in
society. In doing so, we assume a utilitarian point of view, that is, we do not attach
different weights to different individuals, for example, according to their income
before reforms. Instead we simply add all changes in wellbeing to arrive at our
aggregate measure.7
According to standard economic theory individuals are best off making independent
consumption choices. In other words, individuals, in theory, buy the goods and
services that for them have the biggest impact on wellbeing, as well as accurately
forecasting how much income they will earn, how much they will want to consume
in the future and save accordingly. They would thereby maximise individual
wellbeing, and with it social welfare, leaving no reason for the government to
intervene.
In practice, however, the government will, at a minimum, find justification for
intervening in the market due to the existence of public goods, for which there is a
demand but which cannot be efficiently supplied by the private sector, for example
national defence. Even beyond the provision of public goods, however, it takes a
very specific set of circumstances in which the market and hence the individuals in it
will produce welfare maximising results. In reality, welfare will not always be
maximised in a general sense due to one of the following reasons:
• Imperfect information: consumers are unable to fully compare all available goods
in terms of their prices and quality, which may prevent them from making the
most efficient consumption decisions. They also cannot fully predict their income
and prices of goods in the future, which is especially relevant for retirement
pensions.
6 Frey and Stutzer, 2002.
7 As opposed to, e.g. the Rawlsian view which regards an increase in income of
one individual as insignificant for social welfare if the worst off individual of
society does not also experience an increase in income.
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• The development of behavioural economics is extending our understanding of
the cause of imperfect outcomes. For example, it suggests that even if perfect
information exists many people do not make the right decisions due to complexity
or short-sightedness and inertia.
• Imperfect competition: for example monopoly or collusion that lead to inefficiently
high prices.
• Externalities: where an activity by one person produces an unwanted side effect
for another person, such as pollution, in which case the Government may decide
to impose regulation.
• Increasing returns to scale: this means that it will be most efficient to let a single
producer provide a good or service, due to substantial set-up cost or a network.
• The government may also decide to intervene to increase social justice and
redistribute income via the benefit system.
Due to one or more of these issues the government may choose to intervene so as to
create an environment within which society as a whole can achieve a higher level of
welfare. In the final chapter of this paper on social welfare estimates of personal
accounts we show how these issues apply in the case of pension saving and,
therefore, estimate the welfare gain from intervention.
1.7 What is not in the paper
As we will discuss in Chapter 4, accurately estimating the welfare impacts of longer
working lives would require developing a model to take account of individual
preferences amongst those affected by the change, something which would be an
extremely challenging project and beyond the scope of this paper. Neither do we
estimate the welfare impacts of the overall increases in the size of the economy as a
result of the changes in State Pension age and increases in pension saving.
This paper does not look at the impact of the reforms to State Pensions. The White
Paper contained significant analysis of the impact on individuals and distributional
effects. It is outside of the scope of this paper to attempt to analyse the state reform
changes using the methods applied here. To measure the impact of changes in the
State Pension a model would have to estimate the welfare effects of receiving a
higher income, which is less means-tested, for a slightly shorter period, instead of
the current state system. This would require a different model and the evaluation of
different factors affecting individual welfare.
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1.8 Outline of the rest of the paper
This paper is divided into three further chapters which explore a methodological
approach to estimating the impact of pension reform. Each chapter takes a different
approach to look at the impact of the increase in State Pension age and the
introduction of personal accounts and then quantifies the size of the impact using
this methodology and a plausible set of assumptions.
Our estimates of the impact should not be taken as definitive: If different methods
were adopted it would be possible for a different range of results to be produced.
The methodological approaches taken in this paper are innovative and, as the nature
of this paper should be seen as consultative, we welcome other views on the issues
presented.
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2 Economic impact of
working longer – a
microeconomic approach
2.1 Introduction
The Government’s White Paper Security in retirement: towards a new pensions
system includes proposals to raise State Pension age from 65 to 68 between 2024
and 2046. This chapter looks at how this policy change, combined with measures to
extend working life, may contribute to economic output.
The general introduction provided some background to the proposed changes in
State Pension age and on the broader Extending Working Life agenda. In this
chapter, the impact on GDP of the changes to State Pension age combined with
measures to extend working life are estimated from the possible employment
impacts of the changes.
2.2 Analytical framework
The general introduction set out the role working longer has in society’s response to
the challenge of an ageing population. There are also likely to be benefits to
individuals and employers from working longer.
For employers, with 40 per cent of the workforce expected to be age 45 and over by
2010, business productivity and competitiveness is increasingly dependent on
maximising the contribution of older people. However, many employers hold
outdated beliefs that younger workers are more productive than older ones, and
discriminate against older people in recruitment and training. This means that
current retirement patterns can prematurely disenfranchise healthy and able
people, who want to continue working, from the active labour market. These
people’s productive value to the economy is lost, and their skills and knowledge are
lost to employers.
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Evidence on the productivity of older workers (based on those aged 50–69) suggests
that they are no less productive than younger workers, except in a limited range of
jobs requiring rapid reaction or physical strength that people tend to move out of as
they become older. Reduction in physical capability and work ability is probably
inevitable with age, but chronological age is not a reliable marker. Many older
workers are capable of continuing to work and want to do so.8
Only where older workers do not receive the same level of training as younger
workers doing the same kind of work does their performance show differences.
Older workers receiving appropriate job-related training reach the same skill
standards as younger workers. Evidence suggests that a reduction in speed or
strength is offset by aspects of working that improve with experience, for instance,
prioritisation, planning, troubleshooting and motivation. And, technological change
is reducing the proportion of jobs involving heavy manual work, for example, in the
distribution sector where technology and automation has greatly reduced the
amount of physical exertion required.9
However, barriers still exist in terms of access to training for older workers. Evidence
suggests that training is less likely to be offered to older individuals. The likelihood of
someone aged over 55 participating in training is 50 per cent less than that for an
adult aged 35-44 and for employed adults training decreases markedly beyond the
age of 60.10 Other evidence shows that encouragement from employers to train
tended to tail off after 50-54.11
From the point of view of the individual, delaying their retirement affords them the
opportunity to benefit from more earnings and from the opportunity to save more
for when they do decide to retire. Increasing State Pension age may have a role to
play in assisting the individual in realising these benefits.
A relatively high number of individuals retire early with little consideration of the
financial implications of their decision. For example, when asked about the factors
they consider when retiring, just under a third (31 per cent) of those not forced into
early retirement considered the immediate financial implications. A similarly low
proportion considered the longer-term financial implications.12 This finding, combined
with the extent of under-saving for retirement as discussed in Chapter 4 on personal
accounts, suggests that, at present, some individuals may be making sub-optimal
8 Smeaton and McKay, 2003, for instance, find that men working post-State
Pension age are under represented in the construction and manufacturing sectors.
They conclude that, as many of the jobs in these sectors require a degree of
physical strength, employers may regard them as unsuitable for older workers.
9 See Meadows, 2004.
10 Newton et al., 2005.
11 Humphrey et al., 2003.
12 Humphrey et al., 2003.
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decisions regarding their retirement. These individuals are leaving the labour market
earlier than they would if they had more information on the financial implications
and their life expectancy than they have at present. In fact, evidence suggests that
individuals tend to underestimate their life expectancy significantly. This point will
be addressed explicitly in the next chapter on macroeconomic modelling.
Raising State Pension age might increase employment in a number of ways. If some
people retire too early due to information failures then increasing State Pension age
may help to overcome this by signalling to them that they need to work longer than
they otherwise thought. The reduction in income from later access to a State Pension
may also result in individuals working for longer. Table 2.1 provides some indication
of the extent to which retirement decisions are driven by expectations and financial
considerations.
Table 2.1 Reasons for expecting to retire at State Pension age
Reason Total (percentage)
It is the first opportunity to draw a state retirement pension 39
I always expected to 57
I couldn’t get another job after that age 6
I could afford to retire then 28
Other 9
Note: Multiple responses; percentages do not sum to 100.
Source: Factors affecting the labour market participation of older workers, DWP.
However, estimating the social welfare effect of working longer would require
accounting for the cost of reduced leisure both for those making optimal and those
making sub-optimal retirement decisions. Measuring the welfare impact of the
reform would, therefore, require some estimation of the utility/disutility of
employment for the different individuals affected. However, no estimates are
available, however, for the extent of the work/leisure trade-off or how to account for
differing preferences across the affected population. Estimation of the welfare
impact would entail developing a model to take account of these preferences,
something that would be an extremely challenging project and beyond the scope of
this paper.
There may also be a number of non-financial benefits from working longer, which
will generate welfare benefits that cannot be easily measured. Research suggests
that personal relationships and social networks may be important considerations in
decisions about whether or when to retire. Irving et al. (2005) found that work
provided a social life and social contact for many respondents, particularly those
who were single, widowed or divorced. This was particularly true for people with
health conditions. The researchers also found that a number of respondents cited
the physical and psychological benefits to the individual of remaining in work. They
included self-esteem and pride, and mental and physical stimulation and activity,
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which some respondents believed help them defer ageing.13 Studies also suggest
that re-employment for older workers can improve physical functioning and mental
health.14
2.3 Methodology
It is proposed that State Pension age will be increased in stages:
• The first increase, from 65 to 66, to be phased in over two years, starting in April
2024;
• The second increase, from 66 to 67, again phased in over two years, from April
2034; and
• The third increase, from 67 to 68, also to be phased in over two years, from April
2044.
The starting point for estimating the GDP impact of these increases in State Pension
age alongside measures to enable people to extend their working lives is to estimate
the likely employment increases resulting from the change. The estimates of the
increase in employment are then multiplied by assumptions about gross earnings to
estimate the increase in labour income and a product market corrector is then used
to scale this up to the full economic value.15
The approach developed to estimate the employment impacts of the proposed
changes was to consider possible upper and lower bound estimates of the likely
impact.
The lower bound estimate of the employment effect is based on the assumption that
behaviour only changes at the ages affected by the State Pension age changes. That
is, when State Pension age rises from 65 to 66, only the behaviour of people aged 65
changes in response. It is assumed that, as a result of the change, the change in the
employment rate between 64 and 65 is kept the same as between 63 and 64. This
pattern is repeated for all age groups affected by the change.
The changes to State Pension age only impact on employment from 2024 when the
first increase is introduced. Individuals do not alter their behaviour in anticipation of
the changes. When fully implemented (the State Pension age has increased to 68)
only the behaviour of people aged 65, 66 and 67 is different to what it otherwise
would have been. This is illustrated in Figures 2.1 and 2.2, where, under the lower
bound estimate, employment only changes at these ages.
13 Humphrey et al., 2003.
14 Gallo et al., 2000, Frese and Mohr, 1987.
15 Note that this approach differs to that used to project long-term GDP levels in
HM Treasury’s long-term public finance report. In particular, the latter uses
assumptions concerning aggregate productivity growth, rather than gross
earnings, to derive projected GDP levels from long-term projections of
employment.
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It is possible, however, that this lower bound underestimates the impact of the
changes. Behaviour may change at other ages as a result of the financial incentives
created by the changes, as well as possible changes in retirement expectations as
discussed in the introduction. People who would otherwise retire before State
Pension age may now do so a little later as the period of retirement before access to
the State Pension becomes possible is now longer, similarly many who would retire
after State Pension age may now work even later in life to increase retirement
income.
The upper estimate of the effect reflects these wider impacts, based on the
assumption that an individual’s exit from the labour market moves by the same
amount as State Pension age. For estimation purposes, this assumption means that
the employment rates at a particular age are applied to the ages immediately above,
as State Pension age increases. For example, in the case of the State Pension age
increase to 66, the employment rate for those aged 55 will be the same as for those
aged 54. Between the ages of 56 and 65, employment rates are the same as they
would have been a year previously had State Pension age not been increased (see
Figures 2.1 and 2.2). For example, for an individual aged 60, the employment rate
will be the same as for an individual aged 59 before the increase in State Pension age
has been factored in.
Under the upper bound estimates, it is assumed that the minimum age at which
behaviour is affected is 55. This is the age at which, based on trends in age-specific
employment rates, the trend towards early retirement tends to become clearly
visible (see Figure 1.3). Similarly, it is assumed that there is no impact on the
participation and employment of those aged 70 and above. Given the low rates of
employment among this group at present (see Table 2.2), any impact of the change
is likely to be marginal.
Table 2.2 Current employment by five year age-bands; 55 and over
age group
55 – 59 60 – 64 64 – 69 70+
Employment rate 69% 43% 15% 3%
Number employed 2,600,000 1,350,000 400,000 200,000
Note: Number employed rounded to nearest 50,000.
Source: Labour Force Survey, spring 2006, GB.
One further aspect of this employment scenario is the timing of the behavioural
changes. While the first change to State Pension age is not proposed to be
introduced until 2024, the estimates assume that people aged 55 and over will alter
their behaviour accordingly so someone aged 55 in 2015, who would have
otherwise exited the labour market at 55, will alter their behaviour ahead of the
anticipated change.
This might be an overestimation of the impact of the changes. It assumes no exit
from the labour market over a three-year age range (ages 55, 56 and 57) once the
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State Pension increase is fully implemented. A middle estimate based on an average
of the two estimates described above has been produced to arrive at a potentially
more realistic estimate of the likely impact.
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 summarise the impact that raising State Pension age is estimated
to have on the employment rate of men and women aged 55-69 once increased to
68 in 2046 under each of the three employment scenarios.
Figure 2.1 Projected employment rates 2050 – men
Figure 2.2 Projected employment rates 2050 – women
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This approach gives us three estimates (upper, middle and lower) of the likely
employment impact of the changes as shown in Figures 2.1 and 2.2. In estimating
the employment impacts, the estimates use the HM Treasury projections of
employment, developed for the 2005 pre-budget report, as their base.16 Equalisation
of State Pension age between 2010 and 2020 is factored into the baseline.
Under each of the three scenarios we want to know the likely contribution to
economic output that the estimated increases in employment will produce. To do
so, we use the absolute increase in numbers employed combined with information
on hours and earnings of the groups of workers affected by the change. Applying
estimates of the annual gross earnings of workers affected under the estimates of
employment change allows us to calculate an estimate of the annual aggregate
increase in labour income under each of the three scenarios.
Data on earnings and hours was sourced from the Labour Force Survey and based on
a four-quarter average (summer 2005 – spring 2006). Information on earnings and
hours was obtained for the three age groups affected by the proposed changes;
those aged 55-59, aged 60-64 and 65-69. To reflect the different earnings and
working patterns of men and women, this information was further broken down by
gender for each of the three age groups. Changes in hours and earnings are more
visible over five-year age bands than at individual ages while still allowing us to
reflect the changing earnings and working patterns of people as they approach
State Pension age as well as those continuing to work beyond State Pension age.
The information on earnings and hours is, by its nature, retrospective. It is based on
the employment and working patterns of those aged 55-69 currently in the labour
force. These may be subject to change in the future as working patterns change and
older workers benefit from newly implemented extending working life measures
such as age discrimination legislation. Therefore the estimates of hours and earnings
contained in this analysis have the potential to either under or overestimate future
trends.
In terms of underestimating future trends, it is possible that the older workers
affected by the changes to State Pension age may see an increase in gross earnings
and hours in the future. At present, a large portion of this group has the option of
gradually moving into retirement by continuing to work beyond State Pension age at
reduced hours, but supplementing their income with State Pension income. After
the introduction of the proposed State Pension age increases the opportunity to
supplement earnings with State Pension income will only be available to those aged
68 and over. We may, therefore, see an increase in hours worked amongst the age
group affected by the proposed changes.
16 See http://www.gad.gov.uk/ for the GAD 2004 based principal projections.
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On the other hand, data on hours and earnings may be an overestimate of the future
trends we are likely to see as a result of changes to State Pension age. The data on
hours and earnings used in this analysis is based on those observed in the workplace
and might not fully be representative of all older people. Those who remain in work
at present might be more productive than those whose work capacity is adversely
affected by illness or disability. It may be that the employment of older workers in the
future may feature less productive workers who may work for fewer hours or lower
earnings than those employed at present. It is also  conceivable that those who retire
fully at present may not be able to do so in the future but may seek to retire gradually,
reducing their hours as they reach their retirement date.
Both of these are plausible scenarios, but are difficult to predict with any great
certainty. In the absence of reliable evidence or information on how these trends
might evolve in the future, past patterns of earnings and hours represent the best
estimate of future earnings and hours available.
To estimate the future gross earnings of those affected by the increase in State
Pension age, average earnings for each group are up-rated by estimated real
earnings growth to arrive at future estimates of annual gross earnings. For the
purpose of up-rating earnings, we have assumed annual real wage growth of
approximately two per cent.17
To estimate the value of output produced by these additional workers, a product
market corrector is used to scale up the increase in labour income resulting from the
reforms to the full economic value. This variable, used in economic effectiveness
calculations, accounts for the value of workers output being divided between wages
and firms’ profits and is calculated as the inverse of the labour share of total factor
income. For the purpose of the analysis contained here it is estimated at 1.26.
Results of this analysis are presented in the results section below. The methodology
employed here is intended to estimate the impact on future GDP of increasing State
Pension age alongside measures to extend working life by estimating the employment
increases from these changes and reflecting the earnings and productivity profile of
the workers affected.
2.4 Limitations and weaknesses in methodology
There is major uncertainty surrounding both future labour market projections and
the behavioural responses we expect in response to raising State Pension age and
accompanying measures to extend working life. In particular, forecasts of the likely
17 Given that baseline employment remains roughly constant between now and
2050, this implies that the share of labour in GDP remains constant at today’s
level.
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employment impact of increasing State Pension age are based on strong assumptions
as to likely behavioural responses and, as we discuss elsewhere, may either under or
over estimate the associated employment impacts of the reform.
A major limitation of this analysis is that it can only capture first-round employment
impacts of the proposed reform. The simple modelling used for this analysis does not
include any interaction with other economic variables. For example, this excludes
any second-round impacts that may result from the increases in employment
brought about by raising State Pension age.
To further understand the full impacts of the reform package under analysis here we
have asked the NIESR to help model the impacts by using NiGEM, their macroeconomic
model for the UK and world economy. The results of this are discussed further in
Chapter 3 of this paper.
2.5 Results
The employment effects of the change once the increases in State Pension age are
fully implemented (i.e. once State Pension age increases to 68 in 2044) range from
approximately 300,000 under the lower bound estimate to 1.6 million under the
upper bound estimate. The middle estimate based on an average of these two gives
an estimated employment increase of 900,000.
Table 2.3 shows the annual percentage increase in GDP18 brought about by
increasing State Pension age in ‘steady state’. It is the increase in GDP in 2050
expressed as a proportion of estimated real GDP in that year. This steady state figure
shows what the impact of the changes looks like in the long-term once fully
implemented.
Table 2.3 Annual increases in GDP from employment effects of
increasing State Pension age in steady state
 Pessimistic Central Optimistic
estimate estimate estimate
Annual percentage increase in GDP
in steady state 0.3 1.4 2.5
Source: DWP calculations.
The range of estimates presented here should be considered in light of the
uncertainty surrounding the employment effects of State Pension age increases. As
discussed earlier (see Section 2.3), the impact on GDP of the proposed increases in
State Pension age are heavily driven by how individuals change their labour market
behaviour in response to the changes. This is difficult to predict with any great
degree of certainty. Here we have modelled a range of employment scenarios to
reflect the degree of uncertainty surrounding changes in labour market behaviour.
18 Calculated using GDP at factor prices.
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The combination of increases in State Pension age with measures to support longer
working will make it more likely that larger increases in employment occur.
2.6 Sensitivities
The results of this analysis are strongly influenced by the assumptions we have made
and, as we have already outlined, contain a large degree of uncertainty. Here we
look at the impact of varying these assumptions.
One of the central assumptions made in producing our main results relates to the
pattern of earnings for older workers. We have assumed that the future pattern of
total earnings by age remain as they are at present.
In describing the methodology behind our analysis we discussed the information we
used to arrive at an assumption regarding earnings and how this assumption may
either over or under estimate the total average earnings of older workers going
forward. We relax this main assumption regarding the earnings of older worker and
look at two alternative scenarios of their future trends.
First we look at the case where total average earnings of those aged 55-69 remain at
the same level of those of younger workers (i.e. show no decline with age). This
allows us to look at the scenario where the estimates of the future earnings of those
affected by increases in State Pension age presented in our central results are too
low. To account for this outcome we assume that average total wages for those
aged 55-69 do not show any difference from those of younger workers.
Changing this assumption has the greatest impact on the average earnings figure
assumed for the 65-69 age group – under our main assumption the average total
earnings for this group is assumed to be approximately half that of younger workers.
For the 55-59 and 60-64 age groups a significant difference is discernable but not as
pronounced.
Changing our earnings assumption, therefore, impacts most significantly on our
lower bound estimates. Under the lower bound employment assumption, only
those aged 65-69 are affected by the changes and so estimates of GDP impact based
on the lower bound employment estimates are most sensitive to this change in our
assumptions (see Table 2.4).
Table 2.4 Annual increases in GDP from employment effects of
increasing State Pension age in steady state (assuming
no decline in earnings for groups affected)
 Pessimistic Central Optimistic
estimate estimate estimate
Annual percentage increase in
GDP in steady state 0.5 1.9 3.3
Source: DWP calculations.
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The change to our assumption regarding total earnings nearly doubles the GDP
impact estimates under our lower bound employment assumptions compared to
the results presented in Table 2.3. This is as expected given the group affected and
the impact of the altered assumption on the average earnings of this group.
The middle and upper bound GDP estimates are not as sensitive to changing our
earnings assumption as the lower bound estimate. This is largely because the 65-69
group forms a smaller proportion of the effected group under these scenarios so the
impact of changing our assumption is dampened by the greater proportion of 55-64
year olds affected by this change who do not see their earnings altered by as much
as a result of this change.
For a second sensitivity test of our results we look at a scenario where the wages of
the workers impacted by the change are lower on average than what we have
assumed in our main results. This allows us to look at the possibility that we have
overestimated the future earnings of older workers in our main results.
In this case we look at the scenario where the average wage of older workers is equal
to the average wage of the 65-69 year old group (approximately 50 per cent that of
younger workers and significantly lower than that observed today). Table 2.5
presents the results of this exercise.
Table 2.5 Annual increases in GDP from employment effects of
increasing State Pension age in steady state (assuming
average earnings of affected groups equal to the
average earnings of 65-69 year olds)
 Pessimistic Central Optimistic
estimate estimate estimate
Annual percentage increase in
GDP in steady state 0.3 1.2 2
Source: DWP calculations.
As we have not altered the earnings profile of the 65-69 age group, there is no
change to our lower bound estimates of the steady state impact of the changes to
State Pension age. The main difference is to our central and upper estimates, due to
the more significant changes in the earnings assumptions for 55-64 year olds who
are affected under these employment scenarios as discussed earlier.
The analysis tells us that our results are sensitive to changes in our earnings
assumptions. Our lower bound estimates are most sensitive to raising, but least
sensitive to lowering, our earnings assumption. This is because under this scenario
only 65-67 years olds, who are already assumed to have earnings around half that of
younger workers, are affected by the increase in State Pension age. This means that
if we have overestimated earnings our lower bound results are unlikely to significantly
overestimate the GDP impacts, whereas if we have underestimated earnings our
upper bound estimate might significantly underestimate the GDP impacts.
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2.7 Conclusion
The analysis on the likely economic impact of working longer as a result of the
changes to State Pension age and associated policies designed to extend working
life suggests a positive overall impact due to the increased employment and
associated earnings, generated as a result of these reforms. The range of estimates
should, however, be considered in light of the uncertainty of the likely behavioural
response resulting from the State Pension age increases. The range of results
presented in our analysis is intended to reflect the uncertainty surrounding the
employment response. In the analysis, the uncertainty surrounding future trends in
the earnings of older workers is also discussed and sensitivity analysis shows to what
extent different assumptions on earnings profiles would lead to different results.
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3 Macroeconomic modelling
of personal accounts and
working longer
3.1 Introduction
This chapter deals with the same part of the reform package discussed in the
previous chapter, the measures to extend working life. In addition, it quantifies the
impact of the introduction of personal accounts. It presents the results of policy
simulations with a macroeconomic model of the UK economy. These help to assess
the likely effects of introducing personal accounts and extending working life on a
number of macroeconomic variables, in particular on output and income, employment
and savings.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. The next section broadly
describes the analytical framework and methodology to make clear how they differ
from the previous chapter and what the underlying assumptions are. It also includes
a discussion of the limitations of a macroeconomic modelling approach. The main
sections present the results of the introduction of personal accounts and extending
working life and some of the sensitivities around these results. The final section
concludes by considering whether the results of the two sets of simulations are
additive or not.
3.2 Analytical framework
The approach to estimating the economic effects of the reform proposals will be
different from the one followed in the previous chapter. Instead of assessing the
reform package by starting from a partial microeconomic perspective, this chapter
follows a macroeconomic general equilibrium approach. Such an approach has
certain advantages and limitations and should, therefore, be seen as complementary
to the results of the previous chapter. In particular, using a macroeconomic model
makes it possible to investigate the effects the reforms will have on the wider
28 Macroeconomic modelling of personal accounts and working longer
economy, whilst allowing for relevant interactions between economic variables. On
the other hand, such an approach by its very nature makes it impossible to identify
individual effects.
3.3 Methodology
The DWP asked the NIESR to help model the impact of the reform package by using
NiGEM, their macroeconomic model for the UK and world economy.
NiGEM is a large estimated quarterly model of the UK and the world that is intended
to capture the key features of the economy. It is theoretically coherent and
quantified by means of empirical estimation and calibration over recent historical
experience. It provides a plausible benchmark for estimating the effects on the
economy of a range of different scenarios.19
It is set in what is essentially a New-Keynesian framework where agents are forward
looking, but nominal rigidities, namely sticky prices and adjustment costs, slow
down the adjustment to the long-run equilibrium. It includes complete demand and
supply sides, as well as extensive monetary and financial sectors. Domestic demand,
aggregate supply, and the external sector are linked through the wage-price system,
income and wealth, the financial sector, the Government sector, and competitiveness.
The external sector links the UK domestic economy to the rest of the world. The
theoretical structure and some simulation properties of NiGEM are described in
Barrell et al. (2004). A brief description of the determination of savings and
investment within NiGEM is provided in the annex to this report.
3.4 Limitations and weaknesses in methodology
Using a macroeconomic model such as NiGEM results in a number of limitations. As
mentioned above, such a model is not well suited to assess effects for individuals.
A model such as NiGEM does, however, make it possible to assess the impact
different interventions have on aggregate consumption. Lifetime consumption is, in
principle, the variable that any Government intervention could be seen to optimise
with its pension policy.20 So one could argue that we should be able to calculate a
Net Present Value (NPV) of the Government’s pension reforms, as in a typical cost-
benefit analysis such as presented in the Government ‘Green Book’.21 However,
such a number would not be meaningful.
The main problem with such an approach is that an aggregate only makes sense if it
has an individual basis. The reason is that in this case it is of crucial importance whose
19 It is important to note that the specifics of the baseline are not important in
generating the simulation results presented here.
20 Or GDP or GNP if we would consider this is an appropriate measure.
21 HM Treasury, 2003.
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consumption is being affected at what point in time to be able to calculate an
appropriate NPV.
There is also a more general problem with using macroeconomic models such as
NiGEM for evaluation purposes. NiGEM is a model that assumes individuals have full
information, that markets are perfect and the economic agents optimise their
behaviour. In contrast, the pension reform proposals are based on analysis that
suggests there are informational problems, pension markets are imperfect, and
individuals do not seem to optimise consumption throughout their lifetime.
The issue of simulating the outcome of pension reforms in a model that reflects
individuals maximising decisions using the information they have available to them
is addressed directly when we model the impact of increasing State Pension age. As
part of the modelling exercise, it is assumed that people currently underestimate
their life expectancy and that they will gradually adjust their expectations as time
goes on. We will address this issue in some more detail in the Section 3.6.
The issue of calculating a NPV of pension reform, in particular personal accounts, will
be taken up in Chapter 4.
3.5 Assumptions
For the purpose of the simulations described in this report, NIESR has constructed a
new baseline economic scenario for NiGEM that runs until 2059, against which the
impacts of the reform package are modelled. In this way it was possible to ensure
robust assessment of the impact of the relevant policy interventions proposed in the
White Paper, Security in retirement: towards a new pensions system (‘the White
Paper’ hereafter), up to 2050. Where possible, NiGEM has used the same assumptions
as those that were used for the White Paper and in the previous chapter. However,
where these assumptions differ, they generally have no significant impact on the
results presented here.
As most of the Government interventions considered are expected to have an
impact on consumption, we provide the relevant equation in NiGEM here:22
C(t) = (    + ρ) * ( HUW(t) + NHW(t)),
where HUW is human wealth and NHW is financial and housing and asset based
wealth. The Marginal Propensity to Consume (MPC) is made up of the premium on
the future (     ) and the probability of death (ρ). The higher       and ρ, the less important
is the future, and, therefore, the higher current consumption will be.
As already noted in the introduction, personal accounts are intended to provide a
new low-cost defined contribution pension scheme for those who do not have
access to an alternative employer scheme that meets certain minimum standards. It
22 See also Blanchard and Fischer, 1989.
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is estimated that annual contributions will amount to £7-8 billion once the scheme
is fully running. However, it is unlikely that all of the contributions into personal
accounts will be ‘new’ or additional savings, as a number of people will substitute
away from existing savings once they start contributing to personal accounts. As
mentioned in the chapter on personal accounts, the Government estimates that
around 60 per cent of savings in personal accounts will be new savings, resulting in
£4-5 billion of additional savings each year due to personal accounts.23
To simulate the introduction of personal accounts in NiGEM, we effectively lowered
the MPC, a variable that describes what proportion of income is spent on
consumption, in the equation that determines consumption behaviour. This implies
that, all else being equal, individuals will save more at every level of income. The
rationale behind this from a modelling point of view is that introducing automatic
enrolment and personal accounts will change what could be considered a
sub-optimally high MPC. This change in the MPC would be the result of overcoming
some of the underlying psychological barriers to saving, such as inertia and myopia,
whilst providing a new simple low-cost savings vehicle to invest pension contributions
efficiently.
3.6 Personal accounts – results
Following the proposals in the White Paper, it is assumed that personal accounts will
be introduced in 2012 and that there will be a phasing-in period of three years. In
line with the estimate presented above, we have simulated a total savings increase
of £4.5 billion in our central scenario.24 Figure 3.1 shows what happens to the
personal savings rate (as a percentage of disposable income) in the central scenario.
From 2012 the savings rate increases quickly in the first three years, in line with the
phasing-in.25 After this it settles around 0.5 percentage point above the base case
until the end of the forecasting period presented here, in 2050.26
23 See Regulatory impact assessment to the White Paper Security in retirement:
towards a new pensions system, 2006, and Hawksworth, 2006.
24 In 2006 earnings terms, i.e. the nominal numbers will be significantly higher in
2012 and onwards as they are uprated by economy-wide earnings.
25 As is clear from the graph, the savings rates also move marginally in the run-up
to 2012; this has no direct connection with personal accounts, but is the result
of endogenous changes in the model that result from economic agents
anticipating the introduction in 2012.
26 As noted, the MPC in NiGEM is changed permanently to simulate the possible
impact of personal accounts. This is based on the premise that personal accounts
will be instrumental in permanently raising the personal savings rate, as was
supported by the evidence presented in Hawksworth, 2006. In practice, it might
be that, whatever the initial offset, there will be stronger (or weaker) substitution
effects throughout time.
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Figure 3.1 Impact of personal accounts on saving – central
scenario
The savings increase associated with the introduction of personal accounts implies
lower consumption in the short-term, which initially has a downward effect on
economic activity. Figure 3.2 plots the path that two different measures of economic
activity, GDP and GNP are forecast to follow between now and 2050 compared to
the base case. GDP represents annual domestic production, whereas GNP also takes
into account (net) income received from abroad.
Looking at GDP, the most commonly used indicator of economic activity, the graph
shows a very small increase in economic activity between now and 2012.27 This has
to do with the fact that individuals and financial markets are assumed to be forward
looking. Financial markets anticipate that future monetary policy will react to lower
consumption by lowering interest rates. As a result exchange rates will react
immediately and will ‘jump’ down to a new equilibrium. In turn, the lower exchange
rate causes exports to rise, which results in a small increase in economic activity.
The small decrease in GDP compared to the baseline from 2012 onwards is caused
by the initial savings increase, which results in lower consumption in the short run.
27 It is important to keep in mind that here and in the remainder of this chapter any
effects are (level) differences compared to the base case. When economic activity
is concerned, this base case forecasts an average long-term growth rate of around
2¼ per cent. Therefore, if one would want to find the growth rate in any particular
year one should roughly add 2¼ per cent to the (level) difference in that particular
year and the previous year. For all scenarios concerned this implies that annual
growth rates are always projected to be positive.
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The economy then gradually reverts back to the original growth path as it adjusts to
the new level of savings in the economy. It should be emphasised that all of the
changes described here are very small. For example, the cumulative downward
effect does not go beyond 0.15 per cent, and the largest impact on economic
growth in any given year remains below 0.05 per cent, a magnitude that is not likely
to be detectable in practice.
Figure 3.2 Impact of personal accounts on economic activity –
central scenario
It is immediately clear from comparing the paths of GDP and GNP that they produce
a very similar pattern. The main difference between the two is that GNP is higher at
any point in time; it settles around 0.2 per cent above the base case, still representing
a limited effect.
The reason that GNP is higher than GDP in this scenario has to do with the fact that
it includes investment income received from abroad. NiGEM models the UK as a
small open economy in which investment decisions are taken independently from
the domestic savings decisions. If, as in this case, the domestic supply of savings
increases without a fundamental change in the profitability of investment, most of
these savings will go abroad. This in turn leads to a build-up of foreign capital. The
associated investment returns that flow back do not show up in the GDP measure of
economic activity but are reflected in GNP.28
28 As an aggregate model, NiGEM is not designed to describe the investment
allocation of personal accounts. The overall portfolio of the economy has to
adjust to contain more foreign assets, even if personal accounts do not, and in
competitive financial system this process takes place through very minor
adjustments in returns.
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Given the inherent uncertainty around participation rates and the exact level of
additional savings, we have modelled two additional scenarios which, together with
our central scenario, should provide a realistic range of outcomes in terms of
additional savings. The conservative and optimistic scenarios model additional
savings of respectively £2.5 and £7 billion.29 The results of these analyses show the
same patterns in savings behaviour and economic activity as the central scenario.
The long-term effect on GDP is again close to zero, whereas the long-term effect on
GNP is 0.1 and 0.3 per cent respectively in the conservative and optimistic scenarios.
3.7 Personal accounts – sensitivities
As noted above, NiGEM is a model that assumes all economic actors are forward
looking, i.e. they adjust their behaviour today to events which they know will occur
in the future, though there are some frictions in the adjustment process. To test how
sensitive the results are to this assumption, the scenarios were also run in a model
with financial markets, wages, business investment and consumers who are all
backward looking, in that reactions depend only on past events and not
expectations of the future.
Unsurprisingly, the economy shows more of a cycle with backward looking
behaviour, as everybody acts as if they are totally surprised by the policy change.
However, even with backward looking agents, the short-term effect on GDP is still
relatively small (Figure 3.3). If only consumers are backward looking, the impact is
roughly the same as in the case with forward looking consumers. If other economic
agents, i.e. financial markets and businesses selling goods to consumers, are also
surprised by the new policy, the cumulative downward effect on output is magnified
about threefold. Compared to forward looking agents, there is also more of an
upswing after the initial shock, resulting in a cumulative positive effect for a number
of years after 2023, with a peak just around 0.25 per cent in 2032, after which GDP
gradually falls again in the direction of the base case.
29 As before, in 2006 earnings.
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Figure 3.3 Impact of personal accounts on GDP – backward
looking behaviour by economic agents
3.8 Extending working life – results
The introduction presented the rationale for working longer in a society in which
people on average live substantially longer than before. In the pension context, the
most important measure to extend working life is the increase of the State Pension
age.
The previous chapter, dealing with increasing State Pension age and extending
working life, explains how raising State Pension age might increase employment in
a number of ways. If some people retire too early due to information failures then
increasing State Pension age may help to overcome this by signalling to them that
they need to work longer than they otherwise thought. The reduction in income
from later access to a State Pension may also result in individuals working longer.
As the Government proposals see State Pension age for both men and women
gradually increase by three years – from 65 to 6830 – we have modelled that
individuals adjust their estimates of their life expectancy by three years as well as a
result of the reform package. In other words, we have assumed that individuals see
an increase in State Pension age as a signal that their life expectancy has increased by
the same amount. This might seem a somewhat simplistic behavioural assumption
at first, as we actually estimate life expectancy to increase by more than three years
between now and 2050, but fits with a world of imperfect information and
individuals that can be considered having a bounded rationality.31 As a result,
30 That is, after the equalisation of retirement ages for men and women to 65
between 2010 and 2020.
31 See, for example, Kahneman, 2003.
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individuals change their behaviour infrequently and often use rules of thumb to
drive their behaviour. It is assumed that the adjustment of life expectancy is a gradual
process that will take ten years to complete.
The available evidence clearly suggests that most individuals do underestimate their
life expectancy, but that this declines with age. As is clear from Figure 3.4, even
those close to retirement on average appear to underestimate their life expectancy
by more than three years, which makes our assumption a reasonable one.32
Figure 3.4 Individual underestimates of life expectancy, by age
32 The findings presented in Figure 3.4 are reproduced from the second report of
the Pensions Commission, 2005, p. 93. In Appendix D the report also presents
evidence from a National Statistics Omnibus survey, which confirms the findings
of O’Brien, Fenn and Diacon, 2005.
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Figure 3.5 shows the increase in the level of employment in the central scenario,
which leads to about 900,000 extra workers by 2050, equivalent to an increase of
2.7 per cent.33 The underlying increase in labour supply is the same one that was
used for the central scenario in the previous chapter; however, the increase in
percentage terms differs slightly as NiGEM has its own labour market baseline that
shows marginal differences compared to the baseline used in Chapter 2.
Figure 3.5 Impact of longer working and life expectancy on
employment
Figure 3.6 shows that extending working life has a substantial impact on economic
activity, particularly if we compare it to the effect of introducing personal accounts.
GDP roughly rises in line with the increase in labour supply. However, the increase is
not one-for-one, which has to do with the fact that the employment increase does
not take account of the effective hours worked. As it is assumed that the additional
workers on average will work fewer hours than the rest of the working age
33 The graph shows some slight variation in employment in the run-up to the first
change in State Pension age in 2026. This has to do with the extra savings that
result from individuals adjusting their life expectancy. A fall in consumption that
follows form a change in the perception of the length of life and a reorientation
of production to exports may cause a slight reduction in the level of demand and
employment as the economy adjusts. The more forward looking the wage
bargaining process is, the smaller the impact on output will be when savings
rise. See Barrell and Dury, 2003, for further discussion on this point.
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population, the effect on GDP will be correspondingly smaller. In this scenario, it is
estimated that GDP will be 1.7 per cent higher than the base case in 2050.34
The impact of 1.7 per cent is higher than the 1.4 per cent in the central scenario of
the previous chapter. This is partly explained by the fact that we are now introducing
the labour supply changes in a fully specified model that takes account of relevant
interactions of economic variables. However, one underlying assumption in NiGEM
is also a relevant driver behind the result: NiGEM assumes that all labour supply is
equally productive. In contrast, the previous chapter assumed that the additional
labour supply would earn lower wages – i.e. be less productive – than the rest of the
economy.
Figure 3.6 Impact of longer working and adjusted life expectancy
on economic activity
34 Older workers work fewer hours. This simulation used the same assumption on
hours worked as the previous chapter, 74 per cent. This implies that the effective
increase in employment was 2.0 per cent. The main reason the GDP impact of
1.7 per cent is slightly lower has to due with the fact that not all economy wide
investments tend to move in line with changes in employment (e.g. Government
investment).
38 Macroeconomic modelling of personal accounts and working longer
It is interesting to note what happens with the savings rate. Figure 3.7 shows a
substantial increase in the savings rate. As a result of the adjustment of their life
expectancy, individuals realise they will have a longer retirement than previously
expected. If they do not adjust their behaviour, they will end up with lower incomes
in retirement than desired. As part of our simulation, we assume that people will
work longer to make up for this potential shortfall. The result of our modelling
exercise shows that the increase in the length of the average working life that we
have modelled is not sufficient to bring income in retirement up to the desired level,
but that savings during working life will be increased as well.35
The increase in savings associated with the upward adjustment of life expectancy
explains why the increase in GNP (2.0 per cent) is higher than that of GDP (1.7 per
cent), as part of the savings will be invested abroad. However, the difference is
limited to 0.3 percentage point because there is also a higher domestic demand for
savings. This is the result of the increased labour supply, which in turn will lead to a
higher demand for capital as the extra labour supply is absorbed in the economy.
There is uncertainty about the size of the impact of increasing State Pension age on
labour supply and thus on the economy as a whole. We have, therefore, also done
simulations using a smaller and larger labour market impact36. For these simulations,
we have used the same assumptions as those of the previous chapter. In the ‘low
participation’ scenario this leads to about 0.3 million additional workers in 2050,
with the number for the ‘high participation’ scenario being around 1.6 million.
The two scenarios show broadly the same pattern in employment, GDP and GNP.
The main difference is that the savings rate in the ‘high’ scenario shows more of a
decline towards the end of the simulation period. This is due to the ‘trade-off’
between longer working and higher saving as a means to increase retirement
income; the high participation scenario implies that individuals have to save less to
reach their desired replacement rate in retirement. As a result, the difference
between GDP and GNP is smaller in the high participation scenario. The GDP impact
in 2050 in the high and low participation scenario is 2.9 and 0.4 per cent
respectively. The corresponding GNP impacts are 3.1 and 0.9 per cent respectively.
35 If forward looking individuals know that they will be working longer, but do not
expect to die any later then their need for savings to use in their (shorter) retirement
is reduced, and hence they may save less as soon as they decide to work longer.
This may indeed be why US citizens, who work significantly longer than UK
citizens, save less, as Sefton and Kirsanova, 2006, discuss. Given that the model
has forward looking consumers, without modelling an adjustment of life
expectancy, NiGEM would show a decrease in savings as a result of imposed
longer working lives, as optimising agents that work longer would need to put
less money aside to get the same income in retirement.
36 The change in the expected life expectancy – three years – remains the same for
all scenarios.
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Figure 3.7 Savings impacts of longer working and adjusted life
expectancy
3.9 Extending working life – sensitivities
To assess how sensitive our results are to the modelling assumption of forward
looking economic agents, we have also run a number of scenarios with backward
looking consumers and backward looking financial, labour and investment markets.
If only consumers are backward looking, i.e. they act as if they are completely
surprised by the changes in State Pension age, the GDP effects are very similar to
those shown above.37 If not only consumers, but also other economic agents behave
in a backward looking fashion, effects differ and are more cyclical (see Figure 3.8).
37 However, it is perhaps difficult to imagine a scenario in which individuals are
completely surprised by the changes in State Pension age, whilst at the same
time we consider them ‘forward looking’ enough to adjust their life expectancy
and act accordingly.
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Figure 3.8 Impact of longer working and adjusted life expectancy
on economic activity – backward looking behaviour by
economic agents
3.10 Modelling the different parts together
Our final scenario puts the two parts of the reform package together. Figures 3.9
and 3.10 show what happens to savings and economic activity if we assume that we
can add together the two policies described in the previous sections. This exercise
shows that personal savings rates would increase by about 1.5 percentage points,
roughly the same as the sum of the separate increases. This higher savings rate is
reflected in a higher GNP, which is 2.3 per cent higher than the base case in 2050. On
the other hand, GDP and employment are roughly the same as in the scenarios
presented in the section on longer working, as the introduction of personal
accounts is unlikely to have a substantial impact on these variables.
One can debate whether the impacts of personal accounts and extending working
life should be assessed jointly or not. Contrary to the simulations we have presented
here, personal accounts could be seen as the vehicle that people will use when they
adjust their savings as they become more aware of the fact that they will live much
longer than previously anticipated. This seems a realistic assumption, as personal
accounts are primarily set up to help those who are currently under-saving. The
reason for this under-saving is of secondary importance. It is likely that there are
multiple reasons for this. In practice, both the behavioural barriers that were
mentioned in the paragraphs on personal accounts and the adjustment of expectations
that were modelled in the sections on longer working, are likely to be relevant
factors. However, as the size of the savings increase in the longer working scenarios
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is already much larger than that in personal accounts, it seems unlikely that in
practice there will be a savings impact as large as the one shown in Figure 3.9.
Figure 3.9 Joint savings impact of personal accounts and longer
working with adjusted life expectancy
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Figure 3.10 Joint impact on economic activity of personal accounts
and longer working with adjusted life expectancy
3.11 Conclusion
This chapter has assessed the macroeconomic impact of two major parts of the
reform, the introduction of personal accounts and increasing State Pension age
which is expected to extend working lives. The results show that the impact of
personal accounts is mainly on incomes (as reflected in GNP) and is small but
positive. In our central scenario, incomes are 0.2 per cent higher in the long-term.
The impact of longer working is both on GDP and incomes and is estimated to be
substantially larger. In our central scenario, GDP increases by 1.7 per cent, with
incomes being 2.0 per cent higher.
Both sets of simulations were subjected to alternative scenarios and sensitivities. The
alternative scenarios show a relatively wide range of possible impacts, but they all
remain clearly positive. Our sensitivity analysis has mainly focused on when
economic agents (i.e. consumers, businesses) incorporate knowledge of the new
policies into their behaviour. If economic agents act as if they have absolutely no
prior knowledge, the short-term effects tend to be amplified, though long-term
effects tend to be roughly the same as in the case when economic agents anticipate
the new policies.
The final section showed what would happen if the effects of the two sets of policies
were additive. It was argued that in practice this would not be wholly the case, as
personal accounts would likely be an important vehicle for the additional savings
that would result from individuals adjusting their life expectancy by three years.
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4 Estimating the social
welfare impact of
consumption smoothing
through personal accounts
4.1 Introduction
The introduction of personal accounts, automatic enrolment and minimum employer
contributions (as outlined in the Introduction) will have a significant impact on those
who are currently not saving for retirement, but who will be once the reforms are
introduced. This may be a self-evident fact; however the purpose of this chapter is to
focus on these people and explore a method which allows us to quantify the size of
the social welfare gain produced by these particular reforms.
However, we do not estimate the social welfare impacts of longer working lives, as
this would require developing a model to take account of individual preferences
amongst those affected by the change. This would involve estimating the losses or
(non-financial) gains individuals derive directly from working. There is no consensus
as to the disutility of work and to create a model to estimate it would be beyond the
scope of this paper. Neither do we estimate the welfare impacts of the overall
increases in the size of the economy as a result of the changes in State Pension age
and increases in pension saving. The reason we focus on the introduction of
personal accounts in this chapter is that it is a relatively simple example to use to
explore how social welfare impacts of reforms could be measured.
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4.2 Analytical framework
Saving for retirement is central to the economic concept of consumption smoothing
and, therefore, to maximising wellbeing throughout life. Individuals have varying
levels of income in different periods of their life. For example, the majority of
individuals in full-time education generally have low incomes and jobs earlier in life
are likely to generate smaller incomes than those later in someone’s career. Most
people’s consumption, however, does not follow this income pattern exactly;
broadly speaking most individuals borrow when they are younger and on relatively
low incomes and save throughout their working life to ensure a higher standard of
living in retirement than that afforded by their State Pension entitlement only. This
concept implies that there is a benefit in transferring income from periods of
relatively high to those of relatively low income, in other words to smooth income
over an individual’s lifecycle through saving and thus facilitating consumption
smoothing.
Current pension saving behaviour does not conform to the conditions required to
have optimal outcomes in terms of consumption smoothing throughout life: there
are both demand and supply problems. In Security in Retirement: towards a new
pension system38, the White Paper published in May 2006, it was estimated that at
least seven million people are under-saving for retirement. This means that their
current savings behaviour and wealth holdings are such that they are at risk of a
significant fall in living standards at retirement and they are not smoothing
consumption in a way to maximise utility over their lifetimes. There are a number of
different reasons why demand and supply do not live up to the perfect economic
standard as set out in the introduction:
• Informational problems: there is widespread evidence that people have only a
limited understanding of pension issues. For example, a survey carried out on
behalf of the Pensions Commission in 2005 found that 20 per cent of people
felt that they knew little or nothing about pension issues.39 On National Pensions
Day in March 2006 over 1000 people across the UK debated pension reform. At
the start of the debate only 13 per cent of participants agreed with the statement
‘I know a lot about pensions.’ Even if individuals did understand the basics, it is
highly complex to work out how much they should be saving in pensions, or
other products, or to make detailed asset allocation decisions.
38 DWP, 2006.
39 Pensions Commission, 2005.
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• Behavioural economics suggests that there are inherent barriers for individuals
to save optimally even if the informational barriers were overcome. Inertia and
procrastination mean that individuals, even when they understand pensions and
realise that they need to be saving, find it hard to begin to save. Myopia means
that people are short-sighted, and are unable to clearly see the needs of their
future self. Even though they would like to save, current spending pressures
often seem more important than saving for the future. In economic terms, this
implies that individuals have higher discount rates of future benefits the closer
they get to the point of receiving the benefit (e.g. hyperbolic discount rates).
Individuals also fail to review savings behaviour over time and fail to account for
changes in circumstances, such as increases in life expectancy, changes in rates
of return or earnings.
• The problems on the demand side for pensions also create problems on the
supply side. Firstly, the tendency of individuals to underestimate their future
needs as well as to delay relatively complex decisions, individuals need to be
actively persuaded by providers of the need to have a pension on an individual
basis. This is particularly true when their employers are disengaged from pension
provision. Secondly the complexity of pension products means that individuals
need to be protected by regulation that prevents misselling of pensions. Both of
these issues make the process of selling a pension expensive which leads to high
annual management charges to recoup the costs to the provider of selling a
pension, this will have a significant impact on fund growth. This problem is
exacerbated when employers are small because providers find it more difficult to
achieve economies of scale.
The proposed package of reforms aims to overcome these barriers and enable more
people to save.
• The minimum employer contribution helps people to see saving is valuable,
overcoming the informational problems of working out whether to save. The
proposed balance of contribution rates means that the contribution by the
individual is effectively matched by the combination of the tax relief and the
employer contribution, thus increasing the value of saving. The analysis presented
in Financial incentives to save for retirement40 shows that the employer
contribution and tax relief tends to improve the incentives for individuals to
save. As the incentive to save is increased, the participation rate in pensions also
increases. Evidence shows that the existence of an employer contribution
significantly increases participation in an employer pension41. The existence of
an employer contribution is a clear signal to the individual that saving in a pension
is a good idea, which may overcome some of the behavioural barriers to saving.
40 McCauley and Sandbrook, forthcoming.
41 McKay, 2006.
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• Automatic enrolment into a pension will contribute towards overcoming the
informational problem of working out in which product the individual should
save. It also tackles behavioural barriers, such as inertia, that currently prevent
individuals from saving, even when they recognise that it is in their interests to
do so. Evidence suggests that automatic enrolment is one of the most effective
ways of combating people’s tendency not to act when faced with difficult financial
decisions. It will play a key role in achieving high participation rates for personal
accounts and existing employer schemes. The Employers’ Pension Provision 2005
survey findings show a strong link between automatic enrolment and increased
levels of pension scheme membership. Within private firms with 20 or more
employees, the proportion of employees who were in a pension averaged
60 per cent where the firm used automatic enrolment. This compared to 41 per
cent for traditional opt-in pension schemes.42 In case studies of four private sector
schemes, automatic enrolment was associated with increased participation rates.43
For example, in one firm the participation rate went from 25 per cent for existing
employees, to 80 per cent for new joiners who were automatically enrolled.
• The design of the personal accounts scheme will tackle the causes of high charges
in personal pensions, by minimising the reasons for individuals to stop contributing
to a given pension fund and the up-front marketing and distribution costs.
Through automatic enrolment the need for up-front marketing costs is reduced.
Furthermore the clearing-house allows individuals to contribute to the same
fund when they change jobs, which significantly reduces the cost and hence
allows a lower annual management charge. This reduction in the charges increases
the potential retirement income for an individual producing a real efficiency
gain.
By tackling these inherent problems personal accounts should better enable many
individuals to save for retirement. Improved income and hence consumption
smoothing should increase individual welfare. The approach taken in this piece of
work is to focus on the welfare impacts of improved consumption smoothing across
the lifecycle.
It is possible to look at the benefits of saving in other ways, for example looking just
at the financial returns. Financial incentives to save for retirement44 focuses on the
financial rewards of saving, but does not account for the relative value of that saving.
There are also other potential sources of welfare gain through the creation of
42 The difference in membership between automatic enrolment and traditional
opt-in mechanisms is larger when looking at the median level of membership
rather than the mean.
43 Horack and Wood, 2005. Note: other factors including a required employee
contribution, supporting communications and employer commitment may have
influenced the outcomes achieved.
44 McCauley and Sandbrook, forthcoming.
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personal accounts; however these are not included in this analysis. One possible
welfare gain is that individuals saving in personal accounts who would not have
saved otherwise may have increased confidence about retirement as they have
started to make provision for retirement.
4.3 Methodology
As explained in the previous section, the approach taken to measure the social
welfare impact of personal accounts is to consider the value of improved consumption
smoothing. Consumption is the economic focus, rather than income smoothing,
because it is the actual consumption that is assumed to generate utility not the
receipt of income in its own right. However, as consumption is difficult to measure
it is assumed that income measures consumption opportunities. Therefore, social
welfare changes are measured in this paper by looking at income.
The methodology employed is relatively simple in outline. It involves estimating the
value of income smoothing for the individual and aggregating this up to the
population for a given year and then adding together the results over time (we are
looking at the period from the introduction of personal accounts in 2012 to 2050).
The approach taken involves many simplifications and particular assumptions which
could have an impact on the results. However, as this paper is an exploration of how
the welfare impacts could be assessed, using a simplified model allows the most
important factors to be considered.
Outline of method:
1. Divide population into groups based on income and age.
2. Estimate the weighted NPV of the utility an individual derived from saving in
personal accounts, for representative individuals from each group.
3. Aggregate NPV of saving to the number of people saving in personal accounts
in each given year (making an allowance for the proportions of saving that are
new and that are transferred from other vehicles).
4. Estimate NPV of the gain over time by in turn discounting NPV for each year
and aggregating over the time period (2012-2050).
(1) Segmenting the population: The impact of personal accounts and the default
contribution level will differ depending on individual characteristics, most importantly
age and income level. This is firstly because the income that individuals will receive in
retirement from the state will vary over time as the State Pension system evolves.
Secondly, the income an individual can receive from personal accounts will depend
on the length of time they save into personal accounts. To enable these aspects to be
captured we have split the population into a number of income groups and age
groups.
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(2) Estimating the weighted NPV of the utility an individual derived from
saving in personal accounts: The costs of pension saving occurs significantly
before the benefits are realised by the individual, therefore, we need to use a
technique to value costs and benefits that fall in different time periods. The NPV is
calculated by discounting future benefits and costs using an appropriate rate, and
subtracting the total of discounted costs from the total of discounted benefits.
Discounting takes into account the delay faced by the individual in receiving an
income stream, in this case the pension. The discount rate can include a variety of
different factors, such as the rate of time preference (which measures the desire to
consume now rather than in the future), the uncertainty of the income stream and
the interest rate that could have been achieved on any investment option.
To estimate the value of the consumption smoothing across the lifecycle we attach
weights to different levels of consumption. In doing this we have taken a deliberately
simple approach. Instead of using an inter-temporal consumption function which
allows for the optimisation of consumption over time taking into account income,
the rate of time preference, interest rates and so on, we have adopted a simple
approach drawing on the Green Book45. This simplified approach follows the Green
Book’s approach to measuring the value of redistribution. This approach is based on
the relative income levels of the individuals whose income is being redistributed. The
central assumption is the existence of diminishing marginal utility of consumption,
which means that an additional £1 of consumption is valued less as income
increases. This assumption implies that individuals with different income levels will
have different levels of (marginal) utility. We have adapted this approach to examine
the impact of redistributing income across the lifetime, in which the welfare impact
of saving is the value of the redistribution of income between the different time
periods46.
The Green Book adopts a simple functional form to describe utility:
Utility = log (consumption)
which means that the marginal utility of consumption is equal to the inverse of
consumption, or:
δU(c)/δc = 1/c,
so if consumption halves, the marginal utility of consumption doubles.
45 HM Treasury, 2003.
46 An underlying simplifying assumption is that individuals have the same utility
function throughout their lifetime. We are not exploring redistribution between
individuals because this is not a major feature of personal accounts. An alternative
would be to use an intertemporal utility function, however, the Green Book
framework adopted here would not be feasible under this approach.
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Thus to take a pension example, an individual, who earns £20,000 while working,
receives £10,000 in State Pensions. He/she contributes £1,000 to a private pension
which pays out £1,000 in retirement.47
utility gained = pension/retirement income = £1,000/£10,000
utility foregone = contribution/working income = £1,000/£20,000
Net change in utility = utility gained – utility foregone
= 1,000/20,000 48
Multiplying this abstract gain of 1,000/20,000 units of utility with working life
income, we arrive at a net gain of £1,000.
Although individuals seek to smooth their income into retirement, evidence
suggests that unconstrained individuals do not seek to fully replace their in-work
income, and that gross replacement rates, the ratio of retirement income to in-work
income, of less than 100 per cent will deliver the same living standards in retirement
as they do in working life. This is due to the fact that individuals often face lower
expenditure in retirement, for example, because they no longer face work related
costs, they may have paid off their mortgage, they no longer have to pay pension or
national insurance contributions, or indeed because some of the consumption
during their working lives is now compensated for by more State Pension age time.
We have, therefore, adapted the weighting approach to take into account the
benchmark replacement rates used by the Pensions Commission, which was
confirmed through a later survey which asked individuals about their desired income
in retirement.49 Figure 4.1 shows the range of replacement rates used, which vary
according to income as it is assumed that individuals with higher earnings do not
need to replace as much income in retirement to maintain their standard of living.
47 This example is simplified, so the impact of tax relief and investment growth is
not included.
48 The unit ‘£’ cancels out in the calculation.
49 Pensions Commission, 2005.
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Figure 4.1 Benchmark replacement rates assumed for pensions
commission modelling: percentage of gross earnings
Saving in personal accounts at the default level will not necessarily put individuals on
their benchmark replacement rate; however, it will enable more individuals to move
closer to their target level of provision. The benchmark replacement rate for the
median earner according to the Pensions Commission is 67 per cent. To adapt the
marginal utility of consumption equation to account for individuals not wanting 100
per cent replacement rate we create a weighting function based on how close the
individual is to the benchmark replacement rate. The closer someone gets to the
benchmark replacement rate the smaller the weighting. The replacement rate
measures income, but this is assumed to act as a proxy for levels of consumption
both in work and in retirement as consumption opportunities are based on income
over an individual’s lifetime. The weighting function, W, is estimated using the
following equations:
W = Benchmark consumption *(1/consumption in retirement)
= Benchmark replacement rate * (1/achieved replacement rate in
retirement)
= Benchmark replacement rate
Achieved replacement rate
Therefore, if an individual were seeking to fully replace their income, the value of
redistributing income from working life to retirement would be identical to the
original unweighted formula above. However, if the benchmark replacement rate is
less than full replacement of income, then the weight applied to the consumption
function will adjust for this.
Table 4.1 sets out the range of weightings used for this analysis based on someone
with earnings just above the median. The high weighting is based on the replacement
rate achieved from state provision alone. The first pound of saving, therefore,
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increases people’s replacement rate from this point and, therefore, is the most
valuable slice of redistribution given our assumed shape of the consumption
function. The low weighting is based on the replacement rate the median earner
would achieve if they saved in personal accounts at the minimum level throughout
working life.50 This approach measures the value of the final £1 put into personal
accounts, which is the least valuable slice of redistribution. The central assumption is
the average of these two and can be seen as the weighting on the average pound
contributed to personal accounts.
Table 4.1 Weighting factors applied under the different scenarios
assuming annual earnings of £25,000
Benchmark replacement rate 60%
Replacement rate achieved with no saving 34%
Replacement rate achieved with saving at default level 45%
High weighting (benchmark replacement rate/replacement rate with no saving) 1.8
Low weighting (benchmark replacement rate/replacement rate with saving) 1.3
Average weighting 1.6
The achieved replacement rate is based on the State Pension system proposed in the
White Paper and has been measured on a gross income basis, but including
entitlement to Pension Credit.51
The next step in estimating the weighted NPV of pension saving is to estimate the
income stream produced by pension saving. This is estimated by calculating the
pension pot that an individual can accumulate over time from saving £1 in personal
accounts. When the person reaches State Pension age, it is assumed that they
annuitise this income which then produces a guaranteed income for each year of
their retirement. Then, to estimate the weighted NPV the annuity income is
weighted by the appropriate factor and then discounted to account for the delay in
receiving this income stream52.
Not all saving in personal accounts is assumed to be new saving. It is likely that some
of the saving in personal accounts is saving transferred from other vehicles. We
estimate that there is a positive value to this transfer of saving, because if an
50 In this model we have simplified the contribution rate to be eight per cent for
the individual, which takes into account the individual’s and the employer’s
contributions as well as tax relief. Our model does not consider possible second-
round effects of employer contributions, such as employers passing on extra
costs through wages or prices, which would change the impact on the gains to
individuals, as these are extremely difficult to predict. This does not, however,
make our model less robust, as it is still able to give a useful indication of the
social welfare benefits of the introduction of personal accounts.
51 Entitlement to Council Tax Benefit has been excluded from this modelling.
52 Assuming the whole fund is converted to an index linked annuity.
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individual, switches personal accounts are likely to have lower charges than the
other vehicles. To estimate the value of switching saving the weighted NPV is
calculated for the original savings vehicle (assumed to have stakeholder pension
charges of 1.5 per cent AMC for the first ten years with one per cent AMC thereafter)
and the gain from switching is the difference between the weighted NPV for other
saving compared to the NPV of saving in personal accounts.
Table 4.2 sets out the estimated NPV and weighted NPV for a man aged 30 in 2012
making a £1 contribution to personal accounts in 2012 using the low weighting
factor. This shows that if the income for personal accounts is not weighted there is
no welfare gain for saving in a personal account; this is because we conservatively
assume that the discount rate applied to future income is greater than the net return
achieved on saving. However, once the value of redistribution of income over time is
included there is a gain from saving in a pension. It can be beneficial for individuals
who are currently saving into other savings products with similar expected returns to
cease to do so and start saving in personal accounts provided that charges on the
former are comparatively high.
Table 4.2 Net present value of saving £1 for a man aged 30 in
2012 saving in 2012
Net present Weighted
value NPV
In personal accounts -£0.13 £0.20
In personal accounts instead of other savings product £0.17 £0.23
Notes: The NPV of saving in personal accounts is negative because the simplified approach
assumes that all contributions (eight per cent) are made by individuals. If this was calculated on
the share of contributions actually made by individuals (four per cent) this would be significantly
higher.
(3) Aggregating the results to the population: We are assuming a simple, non-
weighted, utilitarian, aggregate welfare function as the sum of individual utilities.
Therefore, to estimate the social welfare gain we have to aggregate the individual
utility functions. Thus the approach is to aggregate the estimated weighted NPV for
each sub group weighted by the relative size of the group. This is based on estimates
by the DWP of the group likely to be in personal accounts over time.53
The benefit of saving is estimated by calculating the value of each £1 contribution.
Therefore, to be able to add each group together, we estimate the total contribution
made each year by each group, which is eight per cent of earnings between £5,000
and £33,000. Then, to estimate the total welfare gain of personal accounts, this is
multiplied by the weighted NPV of that group for that year of contributions.
53 DWP, 2006.
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As we have explained above, a proportion of saving in personal accounts will be
saving diverted from other forms of saving. A research report, conducted by
PricewaterhouseCoopers, examining the likely impact on savings levels of personal
accounts, supports an assumption that a significant part of saving in personal
accounts will be new saving.54 Therefore, in aggregating the results we have
assumed that a proportion (60 per cent) of the contributions made by each sub-
group each year is new saving, and has the weighted NPV of personal accounts
applied to the contributions. The rest of the saving is switched saving, so that
proportion of contributions (40 per cent) is multiplied by the weighted NPV of
switched saving.
(4) Estimating the NPV over time: Once the aggregate NPV of contributions in
each year has been calculated, as set out above, this can be used to estimate the
social welfare impact over time. This is estimated by taking the estimate of the
benefit of contributions in each year and calculating the net present value of this
series. This has to be a discounted sum of the individual years’ benefits, because the
in-year estimate is estimating the value of the contributions in that year, and then we
need to discount that back to today to estimate the value of the increase in wellbeing
resulting from the introduction of personal accounts over time.
4.4 Limitations and weaknesses in methodology
This approach and method to estimate the welfare gain from personal accounts is
simplified as it is an exploration of how the welfare impacts of personal accounts
could be estimated. There are a number of things that have been excluded from the
analysis which could impact on the results.
The model is only including the impact of contributions made between 2012 and
2050. It is likely that the impact of personal accounts on savings behaviour will
continue past this point, therefore, the welfare impact will continue over time, and
potentially increase further.
The analysis of what income individuals receive in retirement is based on constant
earnings profiles and there is no account taken of household size neither during
individuals’ working lives nor in their retirement.
This means that in retirement individuals’ welfare position is based only on their own
earnings and contributions history, not on the position of their household. The
simplified consumption function does not account for whether individuals would
choose to save in a different pattern depending on their household size (such as
saving very little when they have young children and then saving more when the
children leave home).
54 Hawksworth, 2006.
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However, in using an individual basis to consider savings decisions we are following
the treatment by Kirsavnova and Sefton, (2006), which was informed by empirical
work showing that lifecycle savings patterns could be identified at the individual but
not household level.55
As mentioned above, our analysis uses a simple earnings function in which each
individual has constant earnings in earnings terms throughout their working life.
The value of saving is measured relative to a replacement rate target and an estimate
of State Pension entitlement which assumes constant earnings over time. If
individuals benefit from earnings which vary in earnings terms over time, the value of
redistribution over their lifetime will have a different pattern. However, if individuals
retirement aspirations are based on their income towards the end of their working
life, the value of redistributing income from working life to retirement is likely to be
higher, which means the welfare gain could be larger. To fully account for this the
model would have to allow individuals to defer saving to later in working life when
their income is higher once discount rates and investment returns are taken into
account, which was beyond the scope of this exploratory paper.
The log utility function as adopted by the Green Book has been chosen to be in line
with Government best practice in evaluating policy options, but is also supported by
a wide range of academic research and avoids having to make more assumptions
about parameters than is strictly necessary. This is a simplification, but it is precisely
for this reason that log utility is agreed in academic circles to be extremely useful for
modelling purposes.56 One assumption within the log utility function is that there is
no accounting for risk aversion. This means that the variation in investment returns
and the impact this could have on individuals, in affecting their final income, but also
in creating uncertainty about retirement income during working life has been
excluded. If the variation in investment returns was considerable, then this could
reduce any aggregate welfare benefit. However, if higher estimates of risk aversion
were included, this would increase the value of redistributing income to retirement
to avoid large drops in consumption.
In addition to these limitations of the adopted model, potential second best effects
on other related potentially distorted markets have not been quantified but we do
not expect them to be large. We have identified two markets which may both be
distorted and be affected by the introduction of personal accounts: the labour
market for older workers and the market for personal debt.
55 Kirsavnova and Sefton, 2006.
56 See, for example, Romer, 2001.
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• An alternative to saving more for retirement is to work for longer, and, as the
White Paper identifies, the labour market for older workers is currently distorted
and older workers may find it difficult to find jobs which are flexible to their
requirements. Therefore, the introduction of personal accounts, which will enable
more people to save more for retirement, may mean that the distortions of the
labour market become less significant to individuals, which will improve welfare.
However, the magnitude of this benefit is not possible to measure and would in
any event be reduced by policies on extending working life in the White Paper
since they should improve the efficiency of the labour market. Chapter 2 sets
out the impacts of longer working lives on GDP and Chapter 3 sets out combined
macroeconomic modelling of both changes in saving as well as changes in working
life.
• Individuals can choose between saving and repaying borrowing to smooth
consumption, and there are worries that the market for short-term debt is
distorted by excessive marketing and some of the same behavioural economics
issues that impact on long-term saving. The introduction of automatic enrolment
is intended to lead to more individuals saving for retirement, but it may also
encourage some individuals to take out short-term loans to finance current
consumption. This may then lead to a further distortion to individuals’ portfolios
as they find themselves with significant short-term debt and inaccessible long-
term savings with a lower rate of return, which reduces the welfare gains from
personal accounts. We believe that many people with expensive debts will opt
out of personal accounts (partly as a result of information products specifically
targeted at this group), and that the cost will be small.
This analysis of the income smoothing impacts of personal accounts does not
include anything on the potential welfare effects of increased savings leading to
higher economic growth, or the economic impact of reduced consumption during
working life. Chapter 3 explores the macroeconomic impacts of the reform
package. This paper does not attempt to measure other aspects of increased welfare
from saving, such as the increased sense of security about retirement as a result of
saving.
4.5 Assumptions
Our model assumes:
• 3.5 per cent real rate of return, which is reduced by 0.5 per cent for saving in
personal accounts or by 1.5 per cent for the first ten years and one per cent
thereafter in other pensions, to account for the annual management charge.
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• A social discount rate of 3.5 per cent in the short-term (then decreased to long-
term rate of three per cent to account for uncertainty) as recommended in the
Green Book guidance. The rate of return does not exceed the discount rate in
our model, which thus avoids illusory welfare gains. If looked at on an individual
level discount rates may of course vary, but in the context of this model it is
neither practical nor useful to apply a variety of different rates. Instead we apply
a sensible social discount rate in line with based on the Green Book
recommendations;57
• An annuity rate of 5.6 per cent based on a single-life price linked annuity with
20 year life expectancy is purchased with the fund;
• Personal accounts are introduced in 2012; and
• The net present value is calculated on the benefits of contributions up to 2050.
4.6 Results
Table 4.3 sets out the central range of results, using different assumptions on the
proportion of saving which is additional to current savings levels.
Table 4.3 Estimated social welfare impact of personal accounts
contributions from 2012 - 2050
Additionality
Low (50%) Central (60%) High (70%)
2012 – 2050 NPV £ (bn) £ (bn) £ (bn)
Weighting
Low 30 30 30
Average 40 45 45
High 50 55 60
Using the most conservative assumptions and this simple methodology; that is, only
50 per cent of saving in personal accounts is new saving, and that the weighting
used places a low value on redistribution of income over the lifetime, even the simple
method set out above produces an estimate of a welfare gain equivalent to £30
billion in NPV terms. This means that people over time could feel as if they had £30
billion more in lifetime income. Using the most optimistic of the assumptions gives a
gain which could be as large as £60 billion.
57 HM Treasury, 2003.
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4.7 Sensitivities
As this analysis is driven by assumptions, it is important to look at the impact of
varying assumptions. We look in turn at the key sensitivities, while using our
estimates on the additionality of saving (central at 60 per cent) and the weighting of
income at their respective central levels and keeping the assumptions on stakeholder
annual management charges, annuity rates and life expectancy post retirement
constant.
It is likely that the discount rate and the rate of return over time move in line, if there
is a significant difference between the discount rate and the rate of return then the
rate of return will change over time in response to the level of available capital. Table
2.3 sets out the impact of the discount rate and rate of return jointly varying while
holding the other assumptions constant. Reducing the discount rate and rate of
return increases the social welfare gain, because the impact of the discount rate
dominates. The lower discount rate significantly increases the benefits as individuals
become more willing to wait for consumption.
Table 4.4 Sensitivity analysis of varying the discount rate and rate
of return
Discount rate and gross rate of return
2.5% Central assumption 4.5%
£ (bn) £ (bn) £ (bn)
Welfare benefit 55 45 35
By varying replacement rates we change the weighting applied, which measure the
value of redistribution. In the high case, benchmark replacement rates are ten
percentage points higher than they were in the central case. This has the impact of
increasing the high weighting for the median earner, presented in Table 2.2 from
1.6 to 1.9. However, the impact of increase in replacement rates is dampened
because although the weighted NPV of saving in personal accounts increases, the
weighted NPV of switching saving from other vehicles remains constant. This is
because the value of switching is the difference between the weighted NPV of
saving in a Personal Account and other vehicles, and these move together when the
target replacement rate is increased.
Table 4.5 Sensitivity analysis of different benchmark replacement
rates
Replacement rate
Lower by 10% Central assumption Higher by 10%
£ (bn) £ (bn) £ (bn)
Welfare benefit 20 45 65
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The impact of changing the annual management charge to 0.4 per cent or to 0.6 per
cent also impacts on the welfare gain, as this affects the efficiency gain from saving
in personal accounts relative to stakeholders as well as affecting the gain from
saving in personal accounts. Where the charges are higher the welfare gain is
smaller.
Table 4.6 Sensitivity analysis of varying the annual management
charge
Annual management charge
0.4% real Central assumption 0.6% real
£ (bn) £ (bn) £ (bn)
Welfare benefit 50 45 40
4.8 Conclusion
This analysis suggests that a conservative estimate of the social welfare gain
associated with the introduction of personal accounts enabling better consumption
smoothing across the lifecycle is substantial and positive. This estimate is subject to
a wide range of uncertainty. However, this method of estimating a welfare gain
from increased saving and quantification does suggest that there is a benefit to
society in increasing savings over time.
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5 Conclusion
The Government White Paper Security in retirement: towards a new pensions
system, published in May 2006, contained a pension reform package that is
designed to provide a long-lasting framework. It also announced the intention to
produce this technical paper, to assess in more detail the economic and social
welfare impacts of two particular aspects of the reforms, the introduction of
personal accounts and measures to extend working life. This paper explored
possible methodological approaches to measuring economic and social welfare
effects and provided quantitative estimates. This paper is not a definitive statement
on the magnitude of the effects of pension reform, about which there is substantial
uncertainty, but suggests the direction and possible scale of the impacts.
This paper has looked at two different ways of measuring the impact of the
introduction of State Pension age policies and personal accounts. It first considered
economic effects, in the context of which two complementary approaches are used.
The first is a partial approach that can quickly provide estimates of the economic
effects of increasing State Pension age based on assumptions around changes in
employment rates. The second, more comprehensive, method uses NiGEM, a
macroeconomic model of the UK economy developed by the National Institute of
Economic and Social Research (NIESR). With this model, both the economic effects
of increases in State Pension age and the introduction of personal accounts were
analysed. Finally, an innovative method to estimate the social welfare impacts of
personal accounts was developed.
In measuring the economic impacts, two measures of the size of the economy were
used. Firstly, gross domestic product (GDP), which is a measure of the total value of
final goods and services produced within a country’s borders in a year. Secondly,
gross national product (GNP) which is the value of all goods and services produced
in a country in one year, plus income earned by its residents abroad, minus income
payable to non-residents.
Chapter 2 used a simple microeconomic approach to estimate the impact of
increasing State Pension age. The analysis suggests that the changes to State
Pension age and the associated polices to extend working lives will have a positive
economic impact through additional labour supplied by older workers. In the central
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scenario, this would increase GDP by around 1.4 per cent. The chapter presents a
range of results to reflect the uncertainty surrounding the employment response. In
the analysis, the uncertainty surrounding future trends in the earnings of older
workers is also discussed and sensitivity analysis shows to what extent different
assumptions on earnings profiles would lead to different results.
The subsequent chapter used a dynamic general equilibrium model to assess the
macroeconomic impact of increasing State Pension age as well as the introduction
of personal accounts. The results show that the impact of personal accounts is
mainly on incomes (as reflected in GNP) and is small but positive. In our central
scenario, incomes are 0.2 per cent higher in the long term. The impact of longer
working is both on GDP and incomes and is estimated to be substantially larger. In
our central scenario, GDP increases by 1.7 per cent, with incomes being 2.0 per cent
higher.
Both sets of simulations were subjected to alternative scenarios and sensitivities. The
alternative scenarios show a relatively wide range of possible impacts, but they all
remain clearly positive. Our sensitivity analysis has mainly focussed on when
economic agents (i.e. consumers, businesses) incorporate knowledge of the new
policies into their behaviour. If economic agents act as if they have absolutely no
prior knowledge, the short-term effects tend to be amplified, though long-term
effects tend to be roughly the same as in the case when economic agents anticipate
the new policies.
The final section showed what would happen if the effects of the two sets of policies
were additive. It was argued that in practice this would not be wholly the case, as
personal accounts would likely be an important vehicle for the additional savings
that would result from individuals adjusting their life expectancy by three years. The
overall impact of changes to State Pension age and the introduction of personal
accounts on UK incomes is likely to be in the range of 0.9-3.1 per cent. In terms of
today’s economy, this is equivalent to around £11-38 billion.
The fourth and final chapter developed a methodology to estimate the social
welfare benefit of introducing personal accounts by aggregating the welfare of all
individuals in society. The results suggest that a conservative estimate of the social
welfare gain associated with the introduction of personal accounts - which enables
better consumption smoothing across the lifecycle - is substantial and positive.
The estimates of the different impact presented in this paper should not be taken as
definitive; if different methods were adopted it would be possible for a different
range of results to be produced. The methodological approaches developed in this
paper are innovative and, as the nature of this paper should be seen as consultative,
we welcome other views on the issues presented.
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Savings and investment within
NiGEM
For the scenarios we analyse here, the description within NiGEM of household sector
savings and of national savings and investment deserves some comment. Households
receive income from employment, transfer income from the public sector, and
income from households’ net financial assets. Households’ financial assets include
assets held overseas, government debt, deposits held in monetary institutions and
equity holdings. Of that income households pay tax, consume and save. In the long
run the household savings ratio, i.e. the share of households’ disposable income
that is not consumed, is determined by the ratio of household wealth to income.
Household wealth includes financial assets less financial liabilities, the majority of
which is mortgage debt, and housing wealth. In the short run the savings ratio is
affected by different dynamics between consumption expenditure, the two wealth
components and disposable income. The estimated equation for household
consumption, embodying the long run savings ratio described here, is reported in
Barrell et al. (2003), and in most scenarios we utilise the assumption that individuals
form (correct) expectations about their future incomes when making their
consumption decisions in relation to ‘permanent income’.
By identity a change in household sector savings must be mirrored in a change in
investment either at home or abroad, unless it is associated with an offsetting
change in saving elsewhere in the economy. Within NiGEM three categories of
domestic investment are modelled separately. The company sector invests in capital
so that in the long run the marginal rate of return to capital equals its real user cost.
The underlying production function is CES (constant elasticity of substitution) and
this means that it is the capital-output ratio that is determined by the real user cost
of capital. Government investment is determined by policy in the short run. In the
longer term, all else equal, it is expected to grow in relation to needs reflected in the
age structure of the population. Housing investment rises with household sector
personal incomes and is reduced by a rise in the long-term real interest rate.
62 Appendix  – Savings and investment within NiGEM
Government saving is determined by tax revenues less public sector expenditures,
and these are determined endogenously within NiGEM, with targets set for the level
of government borrowing. Company sector savings are determined as the residual
category of the savings-investment identity. The excess of investment over saving for
the UK economy as a whole is represented by the current account deficit of the
balance of payments. Within NiGEM competitiveness, export and import demand
are all endogenously determined and reflect trade with a broad range of other
economies. Income derived from net foreign assets held abroad, or net property
income, is determined by rates of return on assets held abroad and on foreign held
assets in the UK. Net foreign assets reflect the cumulated surpluses on the current
account.
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